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Overeducation and Mismatch in the Labor Market
* 
 
This paper surveys the economics literature on overeducation. The original motivation to 
study this topic were reports that the strong increase in the number of college graduates in 
the early 1970s in the US led to a decrease in the returns to college education. We argue that 
Duncan and Hoffman’s augmented wage equation – the workhorse model in the 
overeducation literature – in which wages are regressed on years of overschooling, years of 
required schooling and years of underschooling is at best loosely related to this original 
motivation. We discuss measurement and estimation issues and give an overview of the 
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11 Introduction
Pointing to an analogy between countries’ agricultural methods and their perspec-
tives towards education, Gladwell (2008) describes the views of early educational
reformers in the United States on overeducation. He refers to the historian Gould
who points out that these reformers were very concerned that children got too much
education. To illustrate this, Gould cites the US commissioner of education Jarvis
who in 1872 published a report under the title “Relation of Education to Insanity”
in which he claims that of the 1,741 cases of insanity he studied, “over-study” was
responsible for 205 of them. “Education lays the foundation of a large portion of
the causes of mental disorder”. Gladwell also quotes Mann – a pioneer of public
education in Massachusetts – who believed that “not infrequently is health itself
destroyed by over-stimulating the mind”.1
More recently, concerns with overeducation were expressed in the 1970s when
the supply of educated workers seemed to outpace its demand in the labor market
(Berg, 1970; Freeman, 1975, 1976), apparently resulting in a substantial reduction
in the returns to schooling. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which is based on data
presented in Smith and Welch (1978). The numbers from 1969 to 1974 (between the
vertical lines) in panel A reproduce the key evidence provided by Freeman (1976).
The line “New entrants” shows a sharp decline in the ratio of the average income of
new entrants with a college degree and the average income of high school graduates
of the same age (between 25 and 34). In a period of just six years the income
premium fell from 40 percent to 16 percent. This decline suggests that supply
outpaced demand and caused concerns about overinvestment in college education in
the US. In his book "The Overeducated American", which was published in 1976,
Freeman predicts that a situation with substantial oversupply of college graduates is
likely to remain for many years to come. Due to this prediction the book attracted
much attention.
Soon after its publication, Freeman’s book was critically reviewed by Smith and
Welch (1978).2 They ﬁrst added data for two years prior to the period covered in
Freeman’s analysis and for two years following his period (the dashed line segments
in Figure 1). Adding this information clearly tunes down the spectacular gist of the
1Gladwell argues that such concerns were totally absent in East-Asian countries like Japan,
Singapore and Korea. He points to the analogy between this diﬀerence in perspectives on schooling
and the diﬀerence in agricultural methods in both parts of the world. Growing rice is much more
labor intensive than growing wheat, and moreover, the quality of rice paddies improves after every
crop (even with multiple crops per year). In contrast wheat ﬁelds need to be idle once every so
many seasons.
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(b) Relative to high school graduates entering the labor market at the same time
Figure 1. Ratio of income/earnings of college to high school graduates
3graph: between 1967 and 1976 the fall in the income ratio among new entrants is
only 8 percentage points instead of 24.
Smith and Welch argued that the evidence is more consistent with an over-
crowded labor market amongst new entrants due to larger cohort sizes than with
a situation of overeducation. The line for “New entrants” in panel A compares
earnings of college graduates in the age bracket of 25-34 with the earnings of high
school graduates in that same age bracket. But while college graduates enter the
labor market around age 25, high school graduates enter the labor market at an
earlier age. Hence, the graph compares earnings of new entrants with college to
earnings of high school graduates with some years of labor market experience. This
means that although the line suggests that the college premium for new entrants
has declined, it may as well be explained by new entrants from large cohorts (col-
lege graduates of 25-34 in 1973 and 1974) being in a disadvantaged position relative
to those with some experience from large cohorts (high school graduates of 25-34
in 1973 and 1974). To eliminate the eﬀect of labor market experience, Smith and
Welch compare the earnings of college graduates in the age bracket of 25-34 to the
earnings of high school graduates of 20-29. This gives the “New entrants” line of
panel B. Although the ratio still reaches its lowest value in 1974, the declining trend
observed here is much less pronounced.3
Although Smith and Welch’s review together with the increase in relative earn-
ings of college graduates shortly after 1974 seem suﬃcient reasons to temper concern
about overeducation, the overeducation literature was revitalized by the publication
of Duncan and Hoﬀman’s paper “The Incidence and Wage Eﬀects of Overeducation”
in 1981 in the ﬁrst issue of the Economics of Education Review.4 Duncan and Hoﬀ-
man followed the lead of Eckaus (1964) and Berg (1970) to analyze overeducation by
confronting levels of education supplied by workers and education levels “demanded”
by jobs. But where previous authors confronted these two variables at an aggregate
level, Duncan and Hoﬀman analyze overeducation at an individual level by compar-
ing workers who end up in a job that matches their level of acquired education to
workers that end up in a job that requires more education or less schooling than
3Later studies about wage inequality across skill groups conﬁrm that the drop in the college
premium observed by Freeman was a short-lived phenomenon (see Autor and Katz, 1999).
4The top journals (American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Econometrica and the Review of Economic Studies) published hardly anything on
the topic. To a large extent this is also true for the top ﬁeld journals (Journal of Labor Economics,
Journal of Human Resources, Review of Economics and Statistics and the Industrial and Labor
Relations Review). In contrast ﬁve papers in the top-10 of most cited papers published in the
Economics of Education Review have overeducation as their topic. These are: Hartog (2000)(rank
1; 95 citations), Duncan and Hoﬀman (1981)(4; 78), Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000)(5;
68), Dolton and Vignoles (2000) (6; 62), Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988)(9; 55).
4they acquired. They introduced a speciﬁcation of the wage equation that allows for
the separate estimation of returns for years of education required for the job, years









iβ + εi (1)
where wi denotes the wage, Sr is years of education required for the job, So years
of overeducation, and Su years of undereducation. xi is a vector of control variables
including experience and experience squared. δr, δo and δu are the returns to required
years of education, years of overeducation and years of undereducation, respectively.
Duncan and Hoﬀman’s seminal paper triggered the start of a separate sub-ﬁeld:
the economics of overeducation.5 This chapter reviews this literature.6 The next
section analyzes how the approach of Duncan and Hoﬀman relates to the original
overeducation literature, and which questions their approach potentially addresses.
In Section 3, we describe how diﬀerent authors have measured required educa-
tion, and thereby overeducation and undereducation. We then turn in Section 4 to
the incidence of overeducation and undereducation and to the factors that correlate
with overeducation and undereducation. In Section 5 we turn to a more detailed
discussion of Duncan and Hoﬀman’s wage equation. This section discusses the spec-
iﬁcation of the wage equation, it gives an overview of the results that have been
obtained using this speciﬁcation, and it discusses problems with this approach due
to omitted variable bias and measurement error issues. In Section 6 we discuss how
the ﬁndings relate to diﬀerent theories about the functioning of the labor market.
These theories include human capital theory, career mobility, job competition the-
ory, signaling/screening, preferences, and search and matching. The ﬁnal section
summarizes and concludes.
2 Questions
The question whether there is overinvestment in education is interesting and clearly
relevant from a policy perspective. Especially in the context of continental Eu-
ropean countries where education is heavily subsidized, it is important to know
whether education investments pay oﬀ. In Freeman’s framework, the key indicator
5We asked Professor Duncan how he perceives the continued success of their speciﬁcation. He
responded that “It took awhile for the simplicity of the required, surplus and deﬁcit categorization
to dawn on us, but I think that its transparency led people to remember the results and the
analysis. Also, the topic sits in the middle of the human capital, credentialing and labor market
institutions literatures, a popular place to be.”
6Other reviews of this literature include: Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000); Hartog
(2000); McGuinness (2006); Sloane (2003).
5for overinvestment in education is the rate of return to education, or the college
premium.
Freeman’s analysis ﬁts the neoclassical framework. The college wage premium
falls in response to an increase in the supply of highly educated workers. This can
happen because ﬁrms adjust their production technology to take advantage of the
now relatively cheaper and abundant input factor of highly educated workers. It
can also happen through a process in which highly educated workers compete for a
limited number of skilled jobs by underbidding the wages they demand. Whether
ﬁrms adjusted their technology can be inferred from changes in the required levels
of skills.
In theory, both private and social returns to education investments can be calcu-
lated, where the latter takes government expenditures and externalities into account.
Estimation and valuation of externalities is, however, diﬃcult. If the return (prefer-
ably the social) is low in comparison to returns on investments that are equally
risky, this can be regarded as evidence of overinvestment. It is important to realize
that this is indicative for overinvestment at an aggregate level. From a policy per-
spective, this is also the relevant level; overinvestment at the aggregate level can be
addressed by reducing public subsidies to education or (in extreme cases) limiting
access to education institutes.
The overeducation literature that emerged in the footsteps of Duncan and Hoﬀ-
man’s seminal contribution has been mainly occupied:
• with the incidence of overeducation and its determinants at the individual
level, and
• with estimating Duncan and Hoﬀman’s extended wage equation in order to
obtain separate estimates of returns to required education, overeducation and
undereducation.
While Duncan and Hoﬀman’s approach is more detailed and precise than Freeman’s
macro approach, and can therefore not be less informative, it turns out that the
additional information it provides has sometimes led to – in our view – misleading
inferences.
Duncan and Hoﬀman’s analysis of overeducation at the individual level reﬂects
a diﬀerent view on the functioning of labor markets. They argue that overeducation
can only be a serious, long-run problem, if changes in the relative supplies of diﬀerent
types of education have little or no eﬀect on the skill composition of labor demand,
implying production technologies with ﬁxed skill requirements. Production is not
redesigned, jobs are not upgraded, and some workers end up in a job below their
6skill level. In this view, Duncan and Hoﬀman argue, jobs are characterized by ﬁxed
productivity levels and ﬁxed wages, and individuals working below their skill level,
produce and earn the same as workers with less schooling in the same job. When
they introduce their speciﬁcation of the wage equation, Duncan and Hoﬀman claim
that it oﬀers “[a] straightforward way to examine the economic eﬀects of over- (and
under-) education”.
Obviously, from the shares of overeducated, undereducated and adequately ed-
ucated workers together with the returns to required education, overeducation and
undereducation, it is possible to recover the return to actually attained schooling –
which is the statistic on which Freeman would base his diagnosis of overschooling.
To see how the additional information is interpreted, it is instructive to quote the
conclusions from some papers that estimated Duncan and Hoﬀman’s wage equation.
“[W]ages do not appear to be determined solely on the basis of educa-
tional requirements. ... surplus education has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on wage rates ... [I]t clearly does matter, in analyzing the eﬀects
of education on earnings, whether any additional year of education is
required or surplus ... [T]he estimated coeﬃcient on years of surplus
education is approximately half as large as the coeﬃcient on required
years of education ...” and this “suggests some potential misallocation
of educational resources.” (Duncan and Hoﬀman, 1981)
“This means that workers who are working in occupations that demand
less schooling than they actually have (overeducated) get higher wages
than their coworkers (holding other characteristics constant) but lower
wages than workers with similar levels of schooling who work in jobs in
which their schooling equals what is required.” (Sicherman, 1991)
“This suggests that additional schooling is not completely unproductive,
but simply that jobs constrain the ability of workers to fully utilize the
skills and capabilities they acquire in school.” (Rumberger (1987), p.46)
“Being overeducated lowers an individuals expected earnings, but the
schooling that causes an individual to become overeducated generally
results in a wage increase.” (Rubb (2003b), p.70)
“[O]vereducation incurs signiﬁcant wage costs on the individual and pro-
ductivity costs on the economy that may well rise if higher education
participation continues to expand without a corresponding increase in
the number of graduate jobs.” (McGuinness (2007), p.147)
“More importantly, the returns to surplus and deﬁcit schooling are very
7low in absolute value and represent only around 45% of the returns to
required schooling. Thus, both the human capital model—which would
predict equal returns to adequate, over- and under-education—and the
job competition model—that would predict zero returns to surplus and
deﬁcit years—can be rejected.” (Slonimczyk, 2008)
“In all cases, those with surplus education received a wage premium
and those with deﬁcit education suﬀered a wage penalty. These ﬁndings
support the idea that productivity on any job is aﬀected by the level of
education a worker brings to employment.” (Daly et al., 2000)
And, ﬁnally,
“In regard to the wage eﬀects of over- and underschooling, we ﬁnd that
the rate of return to overschooling is positive but lower than the rate of
return to adequate schooling, and that the rate of return to underschool-
ing is negative. Also, in general, overschooled (underschooled) workers
have wages that are substantially lower (higher) than the wages they
would have earned in a job for which they are adequately schooled. In
addition, we found that the rates of return to adequate schooling and
overschooling (underschooling) decline (rise) as labor market experience
rises”. (Cohn and Ng (2000), p.166)
All quotes focus on the fact that diﬀerent components of schooling earn diﬀerent
rewards – and almost all quotes phrase this ﬁnding as a causal eﬀect. According to
the same quotes, this is considered to be interesting from the perspective of diﬀerent
theories about wage setting. The quotes also suggest that these separate estimates
are interesting for their own sake. It is unclear, however, why this is the case. Some
quotes suggest that overschooling could (or should) be avoided by reducing the
amount of schooling. Given a suﬃciently high average return to attained schooling,
this is only useful if it is known in advance who will end up being overeducated
and who will end up in a job that matches the actual schooling level. Other quotes
suggest that overschooled workers should be assigned to more demanding jobs. It is
left unspeciﬁed who will create these more demanding jobs and who gets them.
Alternatively, separate estimates for the three education components are of in-
terest if we want to estimate the eﬃciency gain from overeducated workers and
undereducated workers swapping jobs. This approach expresses that the current al-
location of workers to jobs contains mismatches. How many job swaps are possible
depends on the levels of attained and required education of the mismatched work-
ers. While it is unlikely that such job swaps will come about on a voluntary basis
8(because undereducated workers are likely to loose from it), estimates of returns to
undereducation, overeducation and required education will allow us to compute the
potential aggregate wage gain from such a reallocation. This requires, however, that
these estimates can be interpreted as the causal eﬀects of moving a person with a
given level of education from one job level to another job level. The review in the
next sections, argues that this is typically not the interpretation that can be given
to the estimates from the overeducation literature.
3 Measurement issues
Before being able to address the questions of the previous section, one ﬁrst needs to
solve a measurement issue, namely how to deﬁne over and undereducation. In the
literature this is typically done by comparing individuals’ education to educational
requirement of job or occupations. In the next subsection we describe the various
ways in which required schooling has been measured. Subsection 3.2 introduces the
related concept of “overskilled” and how people have measured this.
3.1 Job requirements
Overschooling is usually deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a worker’s attained or
completed level of schooling and the level of schooling required for the job the
worker holds. To measure overschooling, most studies therefore start by measuring
the required level of schooling. Required schooling has been measured in three
diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst method asks workers about the schooling requirements
for their job. The second method is based on information that is included in job
descriptions. The third method uses information from realized matches. Below we
discuss these methods in some more detail. This description is important for later
uses (especially Section 5) when we discuss measurement error issues.
Self-assessment Measures based on workers’ self-assessment rely on questions that
ask workers about the schooling requirements of their job. While this may sound
straightforward, it turns out that the exact phrasing varies substantially across
studies. Some examples help to illustrate this point.
1. How much formal education is required to get a job like yours? (Duncan and
Hoﬀman, 1981)
2. If someone was applying nowadays for the job you do now, would they need any
education or vocational schooling beyond compulsory education? And if so,
9about how many years of education or vocational schooling beyond compulsory
education would they need? Galasi (2008)7
3. Which education, according to you, is the best preparation for the work you
are doing? (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988)
4. What kind of education does a person need in order to perform in your job?
(Alba-Ramirez, 1993)
The ﬁrst two questions refer to recruitment standards, while the last two refer to
requirements to perform in the job. But the ﬁrst and the second question also diﬀer,
with the ﬁrst only referring to formal education and the second explicitly referring
to informal schooling. And also the third and fourth question diﬀer in an important
dimension, with the third asking for the best preparation and the fourth asking
what is needed to perform. It is quite conceivable that the same person gives four
diﬀerent answers to all four questions. Evidence of this is reported by Green et al.
(1999). They asked alumni from the University of Newcastle how much schooling
is required to get their current job and how much schooling is required to do their
job. A quarter of their respondents give diﬀerent answers to these two questions.
Moreover, moving from one question to the other may also aﬀect the ordering of
answers. The more fundamental problem is that questions diﬀer in the factors
respondents are supposed to condition their answers on. It is not clear whether
and to what extent diﬀerences in framing and phrasing causes diﬀerences in the
measured levels of required schooling.
Workers’ self-assessment of the required amount of schooling of their job is by
deﬁnition subjective. According to Hartog (2000) respondents may have a tendency
to overstate the requirements of their jobs, to upgrade the status of their position.
This tendency may diﬀer between persons doing the same job, and may even sys-
tematically diﬀer with attributes that have an impact on wages, such as gender or
completed years of schooling.
A potential advantage of self-assessment is that it is in principle based on all the
relevant information. The downside is, however, that workers may be very poorly
informed about the relevant counterfactuals; how can they be informed about the
performance in the same job of people with diﬀerent levels of completed schooling?
7Using these questions, Galasi (2008) reports fractions of over- and underschooling that are far
oﬀ the fractions normally reported in the literature. In a sample of workers from 25 countries, he
ﬁnds 33% of overschooled workers (with a low 15% in the Netherlands and a high 67% in Ireland)
and 59% of underschooled workers (with a low 13% in Estonia and a high 82% in the Netherlands).
Only 8% is properly educated (with a low 1% in Turkey and a high 19% in Austria).
10A variation of workers’ self-assessment of the schooling requirements of their
jobs is to ask them directly whether they are overschooled, underschooled or rightly
educated for their job (cf Chevalier, 2003 and Verhaest and Omey, 2006b).
Job analysis A second approach to measure required schooling levels is based on
information contained in occupational classiﬁcations. A well-known example is the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles which contains an indicator for educational re-
quirements in the form of the General Educational Development (GED) scale. This
scale runs from 1 to 7. These GED categories are then translated into school years
equivalents (0 to 18) (cf. Eckaus, 1964, p.184).
Measures based on job analyses are attractive because they are based on the
technology of the job. As disadvantages, Hartog (2000) mentions that updates are
infrequent and sometimes not so accurate because they are costly. Other disadvan-
tages have been identiﬁed by Halaby (1994) speciﬁcally pertaining to the use of the
GED. He argues that there is no consensus on the conversion of the GED scale to
years of schooling. Secondly, the procedure assumes that there is a ﬁxed required
schooling level within an occupation rather than a distribution of required schooling
across jobs. For a large number of occupations (47%), it was found that 1960 median
schooling was less than the GED requirement, and ﬁnally – according to some – the
GED scores merely measure social standing of an occupation instead of schooling
requirements. All in all, the reliability and the validity of the measure based on job
analysis have been called into question (cf. Hartog, 2000, p. 132).
Realized matches The third method uses information from realized matches (Ver-
dugo and Verdugo, 1989).8 In this method the required amount of schooling for
a worker is inferred from the mean of completed schooling of all workers holding
the same occupation. Verdugo and Verdugo deﬁned occupations at the three digit
code, and most others applying this method followed that example. People are then
deﬁned to be overschooled or underschooled if their completed level of schooling
deviates at least one standard deviation from the mean in their occupation.
Kiker et al. (1997) proposed a method that is closely related; they deﬁne the
required schooling level in a job as the mode of the completed schooling levels of
the people working in that job. People that have more or less than this amount
are over/undereducated. Note that this measure does not use the two standard
deviations interval around the centrality measure.
The use of realized matches is often regarded as inferior to the other two methods
8This method goes back to Sullivan (1978) and Clogg (1979).
11and is only used if the data do not contain one of the other measures. The main
reason for this is that the realized match is the result of demand and supply forces,
and does not only reﬂect requirements.9 Moreover, – like the method based on job
analysis – it ignores variation in required schooling across jobs within an occupation.
Furthermore, the cutoﬀ at one standard deviation from the mean is arbitrary.
Another variation of this method was proposed by Quinn and Rubb (2006), who
argue that required education may be dynamic due to changes in technology and
educational quality. They therefore allow required education to vary with year of
birth and survey year. In practice required education for a given occupation is then
equal to the coeﬃcient on the relevant occupation dummy from a regression of actual
education on occupation dummies, birth year and survey year (omitting a constant
term).
Groeneveld and Hartog (2004) use the indication used in hiring by the person-
nel department of the organization as measure of required schooling. They argue
that it seems fair to assume that the personnel department has good information
on technically required qualiﬁcations for a particular job. This measure combines
elements of each of the other three measures. It is close to the worker and subjective
(as in workers’ assessments), it uses insights from personnel experts (as in the job
analysis method), and also reﬂects current market forces (captured by the reference
to hiring standards).
Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) argue that the lack of attention in the economics
literature to the possibility that college workers were displaced into jobs formerly
held by noncollege workers, is due to the subjective nature of classiﬁcations of oc-
cupations as college jobs and noncollege jobs. They give workers’ self-assessment
and job analysis as examples of this type of classiﬁcation. As an alternative they
propose to deﬁne a noncollege job as a job that oﬀers a low college premium. An
occupation with a large college premium signals that college workers have skills that
are valued by employers in that occupation (p. 455). This approach to measure
skill requirement is conceptually closed to Verdugo and Verdugo’s approach as their
classiﬁcation is also based on market signals (i.e., employers’ willingness to pay a
premium for college-educated workers) rather than on subjective judgments. At the
same time these two approach may produce very diﬀerent results.
Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) estimate occupation-speciﬁc log wage regressions
to obtain occupation-speciﬁc college premiums. Occupations with a college pre-
mium below a certain threshold are classiﬁed as noncollege jobs. Using a threshold
9Notice, however, that the same argument applies to methods using information based on hiring
standards (such as the question used in Duncan and Hoﬀman, 1981).
12of 10 percent, they ﬁnd that in 1983, 10.7% of all college graduates worked in a
noncollege job.10 They also show that their approach gives a rather diﬀerent picture
of the development of the share of college graduates in a noncollege job than would
be obtained if workers’ self-assessment is used. While their approach shows a 6.6
percentage points decline in this share between 1983 and 1994, based on workers’
self-assessment there is a 2.2 percentage points increase.
3.2 Overskilled
At one point, various authors became concerned with the fact that overschooled
workers need not be identical to adequately matched workers. Overschooled workers
may have lower skill levels and overschooling does therefore not necessarily imply
that someone is overskilled (e.g. Allen and Van der Velden 2001).
One approach to correct for such unobserved heterogeneity or omitted variable
bias, is an instrumental variable approach that exploits exogenous variation in the
levels of completed schooling and required schooling.11 So far ﬁnding credible instru-
mental variables has proven to be very diﬃcult (if not impossible), and researchers
have instead constructed measures that somehow attempt to capture workers’ excess
skill. An example is Chevalier (2003) who criticized the (then) existing measures of
overschooling because they implicitly assume that all workers with a given education
level are perfect substitutes.
For the case of university graduates, Chevalier distinguishes two ability levels
(clever and under-achiever) and three job levels (graduate jobs, non-graduate jobs,
and upgraded non-graduate jobs). The following allocations are possible in this
setup: clever workers can end up in a graduate job or in an upgraded job. In a
graduate job their match is perfect, in an upgraded job they are genuinely overedu-
cated. Underachievers can end up in an upgraded job of in a non-graduate job. In
an upgraded job they are apparently overeducated, in a non-graduate job they are
genuinely overeducated.12
Clever Underachiever
Graduate job Perfect match X
Upgraded non-graduate job Genuine overeducation Apparent overeducation
Normal non-graduate job X Genuine overeducation
10At the same time, the correlation between the occupation-speciﬁc college premium and the
wages oﬀered to college graduates within an occupation is positive but weak (0.33).
11In Section 5 we show that exogenous variation in just one of these is not enough to identify
the return to overschooling.
12By assumption clever graduates cannot end up in a normal non-graduate job, and underachiev-
ers cannot end up in a graduate job.
13Neither the worker’s skill level nor whether a non-graduate job has been up-
graded are observed in his data. Instead Chevalier uses information about workers’
satisfaction with the match between their work and their qualiﬁcations. Graduates
who work in a non-graduate job are considered genuinely overschooled if they are
dissatisﬁed with this match, otherwise they are considered to be apparently over-
schooled. Using a sample of almost 5,000 individuals who graduated from a higher
education institution in the United Kingdom in 1985 or 1990, he ﬁnds that 10% of
these individuals is apparently overschooled and 6% is genuinely overschooled. From
the fact that apparently overschooled workers believe much more than the genuinely
overschooled that their degree contributed in getting an interesting job, Chevalier
infers that most of the genuinely overschooled are underachievers in non-graduate
jobs (the bottom right cell) instead of clever graduates in upgraded jobs (the mid-
dle left cell). Further support for this is that within the overschooled group, the
apparently overschooled have better credentials than the genuinely overschooled. In
a follow-up paper, Chevalier and Lindley (2009) ﬁnd evidence that the genuinely
overschooled lack graduate skills such as management and leadership skills.
Chevalier argues that genuinely overschooled people may move to a higher level
job over time, while apparently overschooled workers are unlikely to do so. This is
consistent with the observation that a substantial fraction of overschooled workers
are permanently in this status.
Motivated by similar concerns as Chevalier, Green and McIntosh (2007) make
the distinction between overqualiﬁed and overskilled. Someone is deﬁned to be over-
skilled if s/he disagrees with the statement that the current job oﬀers the opportunity
to use the knowledge and skills s/he has, or when the respondent indicated to make
little use of past experience, skill and abilities in the present job. The authors report
that the correlation between being overqualiﬁed and being overskilled is of moderate
strength (0.2). Less than half of the employees who are overqualiﬁed report to have
skills and abilities they are not using in their job. At the same time 28% of those
who are not overqualiﬁed report that they underutilise their skills.
The information that Chevalier, and Green and McIntosh use is admittedly based
on subjective self-assessments that probably contain a substantial amount of mea-
surement error. Yet, their results give a strong indication that the estimated return
to overschooling in Duncan and Hoﬀman’s wage equation is biased.13
We have seen that the existing approaches to measuring overschooling are very
13Overskilling is not the only new concept introduced in the overschooling literature. In fact
there is a whole range of closely related terms that researchers working on overschooling issues use.
In a report on skill mismatch in Europe, CEDEFOP (2010) even introduces a glossary of – mostly
self-explanatory – terms.
14much data driven. Ideally one would like to have a theoretical basis for measure-
ment and be explicit about these conditioning factors and whether they should be
contemporeneous or relative to the lifecycle, be made on an ex-ante basis or ex-post.
In practice this is not the case. Each method and each survey question either im-
plicitly or explicity conditions on diﬀerent factors, whether it is hiring standards,
performance requirements, relative prices, etc. It is unclear which method is to be
preferred, and importantly the diﬀerent measures only correlate imperfectly suggest-
ing that measurement error is a concern once these measures are used for analysis.
4 Incidence
In this section we describe ﬁndings regarding the incidence of overschooling and
underschooling. We start with the incidence of overschooling and underschooling
at an aggregate level, and the patterns of these incidences across countries and
over time. We then discuss the systematic diﬀerences that exist in the measured
incidence of overschooling and underschooling due to the use of diﬀerent measures of
required schooling. Finally we turn to overschooling and underschooling at the level
of individual workers. Which individual characteristics correlate signiﬁcantly with
overschooling and underschooling, and how persistent is the individual overschooled
or underschooled status over time?
4.1 Aggregate incidence
Most studies dealing with overschooling report the incidence of overschooling and
underschooling observed in the dataset that is used for the analysis. We collected
many of these studies and Table 1 reports the (unweighted) means and medians
of the reported shares of overschooled and underschooled workers.14 The ﬁrst row
reports these statistics for all studies together, in the next rows we report the means
and medians for diﬀerent continents, for time periods, by measure of required school-
ing and by gender.
The overall means reported by existing studies is 30 percent for the share of
overschooled workers and 26 percent for the share of underschooled workers. For
the share of overschooled workers the median is equal to the mean, for the share
of underschooled workers the median of the shares reported by existing studies is
somewhat below the mean. This indicates that outliers do not play a major role.
The share of overschooling is on average larger in studies that report results
for the US/Canada than elsewhere, while the share of underschooled is on average
14We report the median to check to what extent the mean is sensitive to outliers.
15Table 1. Incidence of overschooling and underschooling
Fraction underschooled Fraction overschooled
Mean Median Mean Median
All studies 0.26 0.21 0.30 0.30
By continent
Asia 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.29
Australia n/a n/a 0.08 0.08
Europe 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.28
Latin America 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.18
US/Canada 0.16 0.16 0.37 0.35
By decade
1970s 0.12 0.12 0.40 0.40
1980s 0.23 0.21 0.30 0.32
1990s 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.25
2000s 0.49 0.50 0.39 0.40
By measure of Sr
Direct self-assessment 0.10 0.10 0.33 0.33
Firm’s recruitment 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.19
Job analysis 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.29
Mean 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.13
Mode 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.30
Quinn&Rubb 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Self-assessment 0.32 0.22 0.37 0.33
By gender
Female 0.21 0.19 0.28 0.31
Both 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.31
Male 0.21 0.19 0.28 0.30
Source: Database constructed from existing studies.
16somewhat larger in studies dealing with European countries than in studies dealing
with other countries. This goes against economic priors since education is more
subsidized and labor markets are arguably more imperfect in Europe. Both factors
would lead to higher levels of overeducation in Europe compared to America. There
appears to be a decline in reported overschooling form the 1970s to the 1990s. This
on the other hand is consistent with the literature on skill-biased technical change.
In the 2000s there is suddenly a sharp increase. This increase is, however, solely
attributable to the shares reported in the study by Galasi (2008). As we discussed
in Section 3, this study employs a somewhat diﬀerent method to measure required
schooling.
Studies reveal no systematic diﬀerence between the reported shares of over/underschooled
men and women. Strangely enough, studies that report results for men and women
together, tend to ﬁnd larger shares of over/underschooled workers.
Finally, the fractions of over- and underschooled workers reported in diﬀerent
studies, varies greatly with the method that was used to measure required schooling.
The methods using workers’ self-assessment or the information from job analysts ﬁnd
shares of overschooling of over 30 percent, the same is true for the mode method.
The mean method – which uses the 2 standard deviations bandwidth, ﬁnds much
lower shares of overschooled (and underschooled) workers. These results support
concerns over measurement error.
4.2 Individual level – determinants
Many studies estimate probit or similar binary outcome models of the determinants
of overschooling and underschooling. The speciﬁcation of these models varies widely
between studies, complicating the comparison of the resulting estimates. There is
typically little motivation of why some variables are included as controls and not
others. An additional complication is that some of the included regressors such as
tenure are potentially endogenous. More or less consistent ﬁndings across studies
are that young people, women, migrants and people who are unmarried are more
likely to be overschooled.
Gender The higher incidence of overschooling amongst women has been addressed
in Frank (1978). His explanation is that when the men are the prime income earners
in a household and when the choice of location is determined by the man’s labor
market prospects, women are necessarily more restricted, and this may translate in
an increased probability to be overschooled.
17Age Older workers are less likely to be overschooled than their younger colleagues.
This fact is consistent with search theory which predicts that workers are increasingly
in better matches, but also with the theory of career mobility where workers who
are overschooled in their ﬁrst job have a higher probability to be promoted. It is
also consistent with the view that the labor market rewards workers’ entire bundle
of human capital in which extra schooling can compensate for lack of experience.
The observed age eﬀect is also consistent with a gradual upgrading of schooling
requirements.
Ethnicity The number of studies inquiring the relation between ethnicity and over-
schooling is limited (Green et al. (2007) and Battu et al. (2004) are exceptions). This
is probably partially due to problems of comparibility of schooling in the country
of origin to schooling in the country of residence. When minorities have not been
educated in other countries, a rationale for higher overschooling incidence amongst
minority groups runs similar to the rationales for women and young people. They
may be more geographically restricted, and/or they may need the extra schooling to
compensate for other shortages in their human capital bundle, such as proﬁciency
in the native language. Of course, higher overschooling incidence among minorities
may also reﬂect plain labor market discrimination.
Ability Another determinant of being overschooled may be a lower level of ability.
The studies that have access to ability measures ﬁnd that ability and overschooling
(given the level of actual schooling) are indeed negatively correlated.
Chevalier and Lindley (2009) construct a measure of unobserved ability as the
residual from a ﬁrst-job earnings equation capturing all observed characteristics of
an individual including job characteristics that aﬀect wages over the control variables
included. Including these residuals should then proxy for time invariant ﬁxed unob-
servable characteristics. Estimates from multinomial logit models show that a one
standard deviation increase in the unobservable component reduces the probability
to be apparently overschooled by 2.9 percentage points, while it reduces the proba-
bility to be genuinely overschooled by 3.7 percentage points. These changes should
be compared to base probabilities of 19.6 percent and 14.9 percent, respectively.
Green and McIntosh (2007) use data from the 2001 Skill Survey in the UK to
examine the relation between being over/underqualiﬁed and the extent to which
respondents report that they use their skills. Respondents were asked how much
they agreed with the statement: “In my current job I have enough opportunities to
use the knowledge and skills that I have” and “How much of your past experience
, skills and abilities can you make use of in your present job?”. If the respondent
18(strongly) disagreed with the statement or answered (very) little to the second ques-
tion, s/he was recorded as overskilled. Likewise respondents who (strongly) agreed
with the statement “I would perform better in my current job if I possessed addi-
tional knowledge and skills”, were recorded as underskilled. Green and McIntosh
report that the correlation coeﬃcient of being overqualiﬁed and overskilled is only
0.20. Less than half of the overqualiﬁed employees report that they have skills and
abilities that they are not using in their job. Among those who are not overqualiﬁed,
this percentage equals 28%. Even stronger is the ﬁnding for underqualiﬁed workers:
they are not more or less likely than the non underqualiﬁed workers to report being
underskilled. Green and McIntosh interpret this a evidence that these employees
have gained skills through other routes after the end of their schooling (p.432).
Very similar results are reported by Allen and Van der Velden (2001) using
data from the Dutch wave of the Higher Education and Graduate Employment in
Europe project. The respondents graduated in 1990/1 and were interviewed at the
end of 1998. For example, of the respondents with a higher vocational degree and
who found a job matching their education level, 13% report that their skills are
underutilized. Among the respondents with the same education but with a job
below their education level, this percentage equals 21%.
Green et al. (1999) ﬁnd that individuals who had higher scores in a math test
when aged 16 were signiﬁcantly less likely to be overeducated in their working lives,
a 10% higher score on the mathematics test is associated with a 2% lower probability
of being overeducated. Using the English data from the International Adult Literacy
Suvey, they also ﬁnd that individuals with low quantitative skills are more likely to
be overeducated. Using German data, Buchel and Pollmann-Schult (2001) ﬁnd that
a poor grade on the school leaving certiﬁcate has a strong eﬀect on the probability
of overeducation for those graduating with a vocational degree (after controlling for
selection eﬀects).15
4.3 Individual level – dynamics
Overschooling is not necessarily a permanent state. For a better understanding of
the overschooling phenomenon it is helpful to know more about its persistence at
an individual level. Is 30 percent of the workforce permanently overschooled, or is
a larger fraction overschooled for a shorter while and is being overschooled just a
stage in workers’ careers?
15See also Battu et al. (1999) (who control for the degree class and institution type in the UK),
Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and Green and Zhu (2010) (who look at degree classiﬁcations and
universities’ reputation).
19Sicherman and Galor (1990) developed a theory of career mobility that can
partially explain overschooling. In their model individuals may accept a lower-level
job in which the direct return to schooling is lower if in those jobs, for a given level
of schooling, the probability of promotion is higher.
To test their model, Sicherman and Galor estimate for 24 diﬀerent occupations
the eﬀect of education on wages and the eﬀect of education on the probability of up-
ward career mobility. They ﬁnd that the estimated eﬀects are negatively correlated:
occupations with a higher wage return to education have on average a smaller eﬀect
of education on upward mobility.
Sicherman and Galor (1990) claim that their model implies that "it will be ratio-
nal for some individuals to spend a portion of their working careers in occupations
that require a lower level of schooling than they have acquired" (p.177). This is
explored in Sicherman (1991). Using PSID data for 1976 and 1978, he ﬁnds that
being overschooled indeed has a positive impact on upward mobility. The size of
this impact is however quite small. Some of the overschooled workers move upwards,
but a large fraction remains overschooled. Various studies corroborate that for many
workers overschooling persists. Although this is consistent with substantial mobility
constraints on the part of workers, it is diﬃcult to reconcile this with a structural
population of underschooled workers. A more likely explanation seems that workers
are and stay overschooled because they lack the necessary skills to perform more
demanding jobs.
Bauer (2002)uses the German GSOEP data from 1984 to 1998 to analyze the
returns to overschooling and underschooling in a panel data context. He does not
report in detail the evolution of the mismatch status over time. From the information
that he provides, it is evident however that rather few employees in Germany change
their mismatch status. Using the mean method of Verdugo and Verdugo 5.3% of
the observations change their mismatch status, while this percentage is 16.2% when
using the mode-index. This implies relatively few changes, especially if one realizes
that some of the variation in the realized match method is artiﬁcial. A worker who
does not change his own schooling level and keeps the same job can still can still
change his overschooling status if the mean (mode) schooling level in his occupation
changes. Bauer is aware of the fact that the small numbers of a change in the
mismatch status cast doubts on whether the wage eﬀects of educational mismatch
could be identiﬁed in the ﬁxed eﬀects model.16
Rubb (2003a) uses data from 1992/93 and 1995/99 waves of the Current Popu-
lation Survey to document the dynamics of overschooling in the US. He measures
16We discuss these results in Section 5.
20over/underschooling from realized matches (using Verdugo and Verdugo’s mean
method) and reports incidence rates of overschooling around 0.14. Rubb reports
an annual ouﬂow from overschooling to adequately schooled of a bit under 0.2. Out-
ﬂow rates out of overschooling are slightly higher for women than for men, decrease
with age, and are not diﬀerent for recession and expansion years. Rubb concludes
that overschooling is not solely a short-run phenomenon that only exists when indi-
viduals gain experience or search for a new job.
Battu et al. (1999) examine two cohorts of higher education graduates in the
United Kingdom. One cohort graduated in 1985, the other in 1990. The 1985
cohort was interviewed 1, 6 and 11 years after graduation; the 1990 cohort 1 and 6
years after graduation. Mismatch is measured by responses to the question: “Was
the degree gained in 1985 or 1990 a requirement in the job speciﬁcation for your
main employment (including self-employment)?”. For men the fractions of correctly
matched workers all circle around 60 percent, while women the fraction goes up
from less than 55 percentone year after graduation to just above 60 percent ﬁve
years later. These fractions hide some movement into and out oﬀ correct matches;
between 65 and 70 percent of the workers ever had a job that required their degree.
One potential caveat of this study is that some people indicate that they move from a
job that requires their degree to a managerial job that does not require their degree.
This indicates that part of the “mismatched” workers is not really mismatched.
Mavromaras et al. (2009) analyze the Australian HILDA Survey 2001-2006. The
sample consists of 15 to 64-year-olds. They consider employees who report that
they do not use many of their skills in their current job. This is diﬀerent from
the standard overschooling measure in the sense that it considers skill use and not
educational attainment. Workers are classiﬁed as moderately or severely overskilled
(and well matched). In the bottom half of the education distribution about one third
of the workers is moderately and 19 percent severely overskilled. In the top half of
the education distribution these numbers are 27 and 10 percent respectively. They
drop however the moderately overskilled from the sample, thereby ignoring transi-
tions from severely overskilled and well matched to moderately overskilled. Average
transition rates per year are not reported (but are probably low). They estimate
dynamic random eﬀects probit models and ﬁnd substantial state dependence. When
stratifying by education they ﬁnd that persistence is especially high for individuals
with a higher education degree.17
Careful and systematic study of the incidence and dynamics of overschooling
has received relatively little attention compared to the return estimates we review
17See also Lindley and McIntosh (2008), Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and Frenette (2004).
21in the next section. This is somewhat unfortunate as this could have increased our
understanding of what is actually being measured. Our reading of the cross-sectional
evidence on the incidence and persistence of overschooling is that although part of
it is frictional, it mostly appears to correlate with unobserved skills.
5 Impact on earnings
The workhorse model in the overeducation literature is the extended version of the
Mincerian wage equation introduced by Duncan and Hoﬀman (1981). Denote the





iβ + i (2)
where wi is individual i’s wage, Sa
i attained years of schooling and xi a vector of
control variables including experience and experience squared. δa is the return to
(attained) education. Duncan and Hoﬀman divided Sa into three components: the
years of schooling required for the job (Sr), and the diﬀerence between attained
and required years, which is labeled years of overeducation (or surplus years) if
attained schooling exceeds required schooling (So) and which is labeled years of
undereducation (or deﬁcit years) if attained schooling falls short of required schooling






















Duncan and Hoﬀman replace Sa in the Mincerian wage equation by these three










iβ + εi (3)
where δr, δo and δu are the returns to required-, over- and under-schooling, respec-
tively.
An attractive feature of equation (3) is that it nests the standard human capital
equation (2) as a special case. By imposing the restriction δr = δo = −δu it is
straightforward to statistically test whether the Duncan and Hoﬀman speciﬁcation
ﬁts the data better than the standard Mincer equation.
Another speciﬁcation that is nested in the Duncan and Hoﬀman speciﬁcation
imposes the restriction δo = δu = 0 which implies that only the job requirements
22matter for the wage. This is consistent with the Thurow’s job competition model
in which marginal productivity is a ﬁxed characteristic of the job and independent
of the worker (see Section 6.3 below). Wages are also assumed to be related to the
job rather than to the worker. There is no claim of equality between wages and
marginal productivity and it is not clear how wages are determined.
From the perspective of an individual who has to decide on the optimum amount
of schooling the ex ante return δa is the more interesting parameter. Separate
information on the parameters δr, δo and δu is only interesting for an individual who
knows whether s/he will end up in a job below/above her/his attained schooling
level. Alternatively the separate parameters may also convey relevant information
about the risk involved in the schooling decision.
An often cited (and heavily criticized) contribution to the overeducation liter-
ature is Verdugo and Verdugo (1989). They estimated the returns to overschool-
ing and underschooling using a speciﬁcation that diﬀered in three important ways
from the speciﬁcation used by Duncan and Hoﬀman (1981).18 First, they mea-
sured required schooling through the mean method (see Section 3). Second, in-
stead of including years of over/underschooling, they included dummies for being
over/underschooled. And third, instead of required years of schooling they control
for completed years of schooling in the regression. Confusingly, Verdugo and Ver-
dugo discuss their ﬁndings as if they controlled for required instead of completed
education. In their critiques, neither Cohn (1992) nor Gill and Solberg (1992) clearly
point out that this is why Verdugo and Verdugo ﬁnd eﬀects of opposite sign.19 As
Hartog (2000) argues: "[b]uilding up a body of comparable research, over time and
place, would be facilitated by deleting this speciﬁcation." (p.139).
A special case of the Verdugo and Verdugo speciﬁcation naturally arises when
considering the impact of overeducation on earnings of university graduates. This
is an intensively studied topic in the United Kingdom (examples include Battu
et al., 1999; Chevalier, 2003; Chevalier and Lindley, 2009; Dolton and Vignoles,
2000; Dolton and Silles, 2008). Also studies from the UK that do not exclusively
deal with university graduates are often not comparable to studies that apply the
Duncan and Hoﬀman speciﬁcation as these studies measure education in terms of
qualiﬁcation levels instead of years of education.
Before we review the ﬁndings that have been obtained in studies reporting esti-
mates from Duncan and Hoﬀman’s speciﬁcation in Subsection 5.3, we ﬁrst discuss
problems concerning omitted variable bias and measurement error. In our view,
18Surprisingly, Verdugo and Verdugo do not refer to Duncan and Hoﬀman’s paper.
19It is straightforward to show that when estimating lnwi = αaSa +αoSo +αuSu +x0β +εi one
obtains estimates such that αa = δr, αo = δo − δr and αu = δu + δr.
23neither problem has been addressed satisfactorily in the overeducation literature.
This makes interpretation of the ﬁndings less straightforward.
5.1 Omitted variable bias
Since the early 1990s identiﬁcation issues have been a central theme in labor eco-
nomics and in the economics of education (see Meghir and Rivkin (ming) for a
review in the context of the economics of education). Developments in this area
have almost entirely been ignored in the overeducation literature. This is not be-
cause identiﬁcation issues are trivial in this sub-ﬁeld. Clearly if i and Sa
i in equation
(2) are correlated – as many returns to schooling studies suggest (see Card, 1999 and
Ashenfelter et al., 1999 for surveys) – then there is no reason to assume that this
would not be the case for the error term and the schooling components in Duncan
and Hoﬀman’s equation. Hence, also εi and Sr
i, So
i and Su
i will be correlated. The
endogeneity problem is likely to be even more severe in the context of equation (3)
than in the context of equation (2). Not only are estimates biased because of the
non-random assignment of individuals to completed schooling levels, we now also
have to deal with the non-random assignment of individuals to required schooling
levels. Even if completed schooling is randomly assigned – or if we have credible
instrumental variables for completed schooling – estimates of δr, δo and δu will still
be biased when workers are not randomly assigned to job requirements. And vice
versa, when workers are randomly assigned to job requirements – or if we have cred-
ible instruments for required schooling –, these estimates will still be biased when
workers are not randomly assigned to completed schooling levels.
Addressing these endogeneity problems is far from trivial. This is illustrated by
Korpi and Tahlin (2009), one of the few studies using instrumental variable methods
to estimate returns to over/underschooling. Korpi and Tahlin instrumented the
three schooling components in Duncan and Hoﬀman’s speciﬁcation using number
of sibings, place of residence during childhood, economic problems in the family
of origin and disruption in family of origin. Not only are there indications that
these instruments are weak, but one may question the validity of these exclusion
restrictions.
Since there is more than one endogenous variable one must also be careful to
verify the rank conditions. If instruments are motivated as instruments for com-
pleted years of schooling, they cannot serve as instruments for required schooling,
overschooling and underschooling. This is easily seen by considering the follow-





r) + ε (4)
S
a = α1z1 + α2z2 + ua (5)
S
r = βS
a + ur (6)
where z1 and z2 are (valid) instruments for Sa, and ua and ur are error terms.
Equation (4) is a simpliﬁed version of Duncan and Hoﬀman’s wage equation in which
years of overschooling and years of underschooling are restricted to have symmetric
eﬀects on wages. Equation (6) reﬂects that Sr may vary with Sa; higher educated
people are more likely to end up in higher qualiﬁed jobs.
Substituting equation (5) into equation (6) and the resulting equation along with
equation (5) into equation (4), gives us the reduced form wage equation:
lnw = (δrβ + δo − β)α1z1 + (δrβ + δo − β)α2z2 + ˜ ε (7)
where ˜ ε collects the remaining terms. While we can obtain estimates for α1 and
α2 from equation (5) and for β from equation (6), the two terms in parentheses in
equation (7) are identical and will not suﬃce to identify δr and δo separately. This
changes when one of the instruments (or a third instrument z3) has an independent
eﬀect on required schooling.
Hence for instrumental variable techniques to be applicable in this context (where
required schooling depends on actual schooling) we do not only need an instrument
for completed schooling, but also for required schooling. This severely limits the
potential of instrumental variable methods to estimate the returns to overschooling:
While researchers have been reasonably successful ﬁnding and applying instruments
for completed years of schooling, ﬁnding instruments for required schooling is even
more challenging.
As an alternative method to address the endogeneity problem, several papers
have applied ﬁxed eﬀects techniques (Bauer, 2002; Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Dolton
and Silles, 2008; Korpi and Tahlin, 2009; Lindley and McIntosh, 2008; Tsai, 2010).20
Fixed eﬀects estimates of the returns to over/underschooling are identiﬁed from
persons who have changed educational level, job level or both. In both cases it needs
to be the case that relevant unobservables are time-invariant. Take as an example a
person who increases her level of completed schooling between waves. She may have
been devoting time to study before the change occurred. If this unobserved change
20Many of these papers employ data for the UK and as a consequence do not estimate a speci-
ﬁcation with years of overschooling but with overschooling dummies.
25in study time also has an impact on wages, ﬁxed eﬀects estimates will be biased.
In practice ﬁxed eﬀects estimates will mostly rely on job changes for identiﬁcation
since people rarely change schooling after having entered the labor market. A person
experiencing a change in the level of schooling required for the job, will therefore
probably have changed jobs. Job changes can however be preceded, accompanied
or followed by many other changes that are unobserved and aﬀect wages. In such
cases the strict exogeneity assumption that is necessary for ﬁxed eﬀects estimates
to be consistent fails.
As another alternative approach to address endogeneity problems, McGuinness
(2007) applies propensity score matching. As the identifying assumption is essen-
tially the same as under ordinary least squares (no endogeneity conditional on ob-
servables), it is not surprising that he ﬁnds very similar estimates. His claim that
this approach addresses omitted variable problems is in our view not realistic. At
best, his results show that previous ﬁndings obtained from OLS are not attributable
to common support problems.
The above discussion does not imply that overeducation researchers are not aware
of the fact that estimated returns to overeducation may reﬂect diﬀerences across
people in terms of other unobserved components of their human capital stock or
of their motivation. The insight that people may have acquired more schooling
than would normally be required for their job to compensate for a shortage in some
other human capital components such as experience or ability, motivated the work
of for instance Chevalier (2003); Allen and Van der Velden (2001) and Green and
McIntosh (2007). It does imply, however, that it is extremely diﬃcult to obtain
credible estimates of causal eﬀects of being over/underschooled. And, as we have
argued in Section 2, obtaining estimates of causal impacts is crucial for the results
from Duncan and Hoﬀman’s wage equation to be useful.
5.2 Measurement error
Another concern in the literature on the returns to schooling is attenuation bias due
to measurement error in the years of schooling variable. Given the discussion in Sec-
tion 3 regarding the problems surrounding the measurement of required schooling,
this issue is likely to be even more important when it comes to the estimation of the
returns to required schooling. Moreover, both overschooling and underschooling are
measured as a diﬀerence between two possibly mismeasured schooling levels. It is
well known that diﬀerencing leads to exacerbation of measurement error problems
and is akin to the measurement error problem in returns to schooling studies that
use data from twins.
26As discussed in Section 4, diﬀerent methods to measure required schooling present
rather diﬀerent results for the incidence of adequately, over and undereducated work-
ers. At the same time, it has been noted that the method used to measure required
schooling does not seem to have a large inﬂuence on the estimated returns despite
these diﬀerences in incidence. This apparent consistency has led some commenta-
tors to conclude that measurement error bias is not an issue in the estimation of
(3). This is of course a fallacy. The diﬀerence in incidence indicates that at least
one required schooling variable is measured with error. As a consequence at least
one set of estimates will be biased (and diﬀerent from others if they are measured
correctly). But since estimates based on the various measures give similar results
these estimates all need to be biased.
Only a few studies have made attempts to address the issue of measurement error
explicitly in the context of returns to required, overschooling and underschooling.
Robst (1994) and Dolton and Silles (2008) use instrumental variables methods, and
Tsai (2010) uses a minimum distance approach.
To better understand the role of measurement error in (3), let Di equal 1 if
individual i is overeducated and zero otherwise. We can rewrite equation (3) as
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where classical measurement error corresponds to the case in which Sr
i and ui are
independent. The classical measurement error assumption typically fails when vari-
ables are bounded. To see this note that, in the case of (required) schooling, when
˜ Sr
i is the highest possible schooling level then ui must be negative. Similarly, when
˜ Sr
i is the lowest possible level then ui can only be positive. As a consequence the
measurement error ui will be negatively correlated with the true value Sr
i. Where
classical measurement error leads to attenuation bias, the negative covariance leads
to bias in the opposite direction.
It has been shown, in the case of single mismeasured regressors, that with non-
classical measurement error OLS estimates tend to be biased towards zero as long
as the covariance between the measurement error and the variable is not stronger
than the variance of the measurement error (Black et al., 2000). In this case the
OLS estimate would serve as a lower bounds on the true eﬀect. When there is a
27very strong negative correlation between the measurement error and the true value,
the OLS estimate is also biased and can even change sign (Aigner, 1973).
An additional complication of measurement error in Sr
i in the context of Equation
(8), is that it will also lead to measurement error in So
i and Su
i . This happens both
directly and through classiﬁcation error with respect to the overeducation status Di.
The resulting measurement error will, again, be non-classical.
Substituting (9) in (8) we get:
lnwi = δr ˜ S
r + αo (Si − ˜ S
r











˜  =  − u(δr − δoDi + δu(1 − Di)) + (δo + δu)(Si − ˜ S
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i)(Di − ˜ Di) (11)
and ˜ Di is the misclassiﬁed overschooling indicator. There are now two channels
which aﬀect our estimates in the presence of measurement error. First there is the
bias channelled by u in ˜ . This can attenuate the estimate, but also lead to a bias
in the opposite direction in case of a negative correlation between the mesaurement
error and Sr. The second source of bias comes from classiﬁcation bias (Di − ˜ Di).
The standard method to correct for bias resulting from classical measurement
error is instrumental variables. This is the approach of Robst (1994) and Dolton
and Silles (2008). When measurement error is non-classical, instrumental variables
is however also biased. To see why, note that any instrument that is correlated with
required/under/overschooling will also be correlated with the residual in (10) since
cov(Sr,u) 6= 0. It can be shown that with a single mismeasured regressor the IV
estimate will be biased upwards and represents an upper bound (Black et al., 2000).
In the context of (10) there are three mismeasured variables, where the measurement
error is not mutually independent and it is unclear whether the results of Black et al.
(2000) carry over.
As an illustration of these issues consider Robst (1994) who recognized early
the potential importance of measurement error. He uses one measure of required
schooling as an instrument for the other (and vice versa). Of the two measures
one is based on workers’ assessment and the other on the GED estimate of required
education based on three digit Census codes for occupations. The dataset that Robst
uses is the 1985 wave of the PSID. The ﬁrst thing to note is that only 53% of the
observations is classiﬁed in the same category (adequately educated, overeducated,
undereducated) on both measures. This implies that at least one of the required
28schooling measures is plagued by substantial measurement error.
Robst instrumented self-assessed required schooling, overschooling and under-
schooling by required schooling, overschooling and underschooling based on the GED
measure of required schooling (and vice versa). The return to required schooling
as measured by the worker’s assessment increases from 0.07 to 0.09 (using required
schooling according to the GED measure as an instrument). For the opposite in-
strumentation the return hardly changes (from 0.08 to 0.09). The return to over-
schooling however changes drastically. Using OLS the estimated return to a year of
overschooling is about 0.05 using both measures of required schooling. When instru-
menting one for the other, these returns drop to about -0.02 and are not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Where Robst (1994) estimates the full Duncan and Hoﬀman speciﬁcation with
three potentially mismeasured variables, Dolton and Silles (2008) analyze a sample
of graduates from a UK university where, by deﬁnition, all hold the same level of
education and can only be overschooled. As a consequence they estimate a wage
equation with only a single overeducation dummy Di. They ﬁnd that university
graduates who report to be overschooled in their ﬁrst job earn less than their non-
overschooled counterparts with an estimated coeﬃcient of -0.16 (s.e. 0.05). The IV
estimate increases (in absolute value) as expected to -0.41 (s.e. 0.10). As graduates
progress in their career the wage penalty associated with overschooling increases.
The corresponding OLS estimate of the overeducation coeﬃcient for the current job
is -0.35 (s.e. 0.05) with the IV estimate at -0.66 (s.e. 0.10). In both cases the IV
estimate is about twice the size of the OLS estimate. Dolton and Silles (2008) also
control for individual ﬁxed eﬀects, and obtain very similar results.
In a recent paper Tsai (2010) uses the PSID data to estimate ﬁxed eﬀects versions
of (3). The author reports negative point estimates on overschooling (and positive
point estimates on underschooling) because the used speciﬁcation deviates from (3)
in that it controls for actual rather than required schooling. It is therefore necessary
to take the appropriate transformation of the coeﬃcients to compare the estimates
to those of the literature. Doing this we see a return to required schooling that
drops from about 0.11 in the pooled OLS to 0.02 in the ﬁxed eﬀects models. Similar
changes are observed for the coeﬃcients on overschooling and underschooling. The
pooled OLS estimate on overschooling is 0.076 and the ﬁxed eﬀect estimate is 0.015.
For underschooling these numbers are -0.057 and -0.010.
One interpretation of Tsai’s results is that the drop in the estimates when using
ﬁxed eﬀects estimation is caused by measurement error. To address this question
Tsai implements a numerical procedure that assumes classical measurement error
29on required schooling but allows for classiﬁcation bias that might result of this.
Unfortunately it is unclear whether the implemented estimation procedure produces
consistent estimates. Moreover, the estimated variance of the measurement error
(about 16) is six times larger than the variance of (mis)measured required schooling
itself (about 2.6) which should be a logical impossibility.
5.3 Findings
This ﬁnal subsection summarizes the estimates of the returns to required, over and
underschooling reported in the overeducation literature. Given the unsolved issues
concerning omitted variable bias and measurement error, we do not claim that these
estimates represent causal eﬀects.
It is probably not only the simplicity of Duncan and Hoﬀman’s speciﬁcation
that has been an important factor for its popularity, but also the results originally
reported by Duncan and Hoﬀman (1981) are likely to have contributed. Using the
1976 wave of the PSID, they report a return to completed years of education equal
to 0.058 for white men. When they break completed education down into its three
components, they ﬁnd a return of 0.063 to a year of education required for the job,
a return of 0.029 for a year of surplus education and a negative return of −0.042 for
each year of deﬁcit education. The return to an overeducated year is signiﬁcantly
and substantially lower than the return to a required year of education, suggesting
that it is indeed worthwhile to break completed education down.
Many studies have replicated Duncan and Hoﬀman’s study using diﬀerent data
and (not always) diﬀerent measures for required schooling. In Table A in the
Appendix, we tabulate the ﬁndings of many of these studies. Table 2 summa-
rizes the ﬁndings. To average the estimates of returns to required schooling and
over/underschooling from various studies, we have used a weighting method which
has been developed in the meta-analysis literature (see Raudenbush (1994) or Van
Ewijk and Sleegers (2010) for details).
The ﬁrst row in the table shows that the return to a year of required schooling
is around 0.09, to a year of overschooling more or less half of that, and a year of
underschooling results in a wage penalty of again around half of the return to a
required year of schooling.
The other rows of Table 2 break the sample of results down by continent, decade,
method to measure required schooling, estimation method and gender. The results
by continent suggest that the absolute values of the returns are a bit larger in
the Asian countries in our sample than in Europe and in the US/Canada whereas
diﬀerences between European countries and North America are small. Over time we
30Table 2. Returns to required schooling (δr), overschooling (δo) and underschooling
(δu)
δr δo δu N results
All studies 0.089 (0.003) 0.043 (0.002) -0.036 (0.002) 151/151/143
By continent
- US/Canada 0.083 (0.006) 0.046 (0.004) -0.027 (0.004) 32/32/26
- Latin America 0.075 0.041 -0.034
- Europe 0.076 (0.003) 0.038 (0.003) -0.035 (0.004) 94/94/94
- Asia 0.135 (0.008) 0.052 (0.003) -0.042 (0.004) 18/18/18
- Australia 0.105 0.05
By decade
- 1970s 0.079 (0.007) 0.043 (0.004) -0.037 (0.008) 13/13/9
- 1980s 0.084 (0.005) 0.048 (0.003) -0.036 (0.003) 37/37/37
- 1990s 0.113 (0.008) 0.038 (0.004) -0.026 (0.007) 41/41/38
- 2000s 0.095 (0.004) 0.046 (0.003) -0.040 (0.003) 27/27/26
By measure of Sr
- self assessment 0.079 (0.003) 0.041 (0.003) -0.034 (0.003) 68/68/66
- job analysis 0.075 (0.004) 0.043 (0.002) -0.032 (0.002) 27/27/23
- mean method 0.108 (0.009) 0.041 (0.007) -0.025 (0.011) 29/29/27
- modal method 0.101 (0.009) 0.054 (0.004) -0.056 (0.005) 24/24/24
By estimation method
- OLS 0.092 (0.003) 0.043 (0.002) -0.033 (0.002) 128/128/120
- IV 0.095 (0.016) -0.031 (0.028) -0.031 (0.032) 4/4/4
- FE 0.043 (0.019) 0.031 (0.023) -0.040 (0.022) 5/5/5
By gender
- Male 0.090 (0.005) 0.047 (0.003) -0.037 (0.004) 51/51/46
- Female 0.101 (0.009) 0.046 (0.005) -0.042 (0.006) 35/35/32
- Both 0.077 (0.004) 0.035 (0.004) -0.029 (0.004) 63/63/63
Source: Database constructed from existing studies. Means and their standard errors are obtained
by weighting estimates with the inverse of their variance. See Harbord and Higgins (2004) for
details.
31do not observe a consistent pattern. Only the 1990s are characterized by somewhat
higher absolute values of the returns estimates. The diﬀerences in estimated returns
between studies that use self-assessed measures of required schooling and studies that
base their required schooling measure on job analysis, is indeed rather small. Studies
that use the mean or mode method ﬁnd larger returns on required schooling, and
those based on the mode method also ﬁnd larger absolute returns on overschooling
and underschooling.
Diﬀerentiating estimated returns to the three components by diﬀerent estima-
tion methods indicates that studies that use IV tend to ﬁnd a much lower return
to overschooling than studies using OLS. Likewise studies using ﬁxed eﬀects are
characterized by a lower return to required years of schooling. It should be noted
though that the number of studies applying IV and ﬁxed eﬀects is rather small.
The ﬁnal rows in Table 2 show that returns to diﬀerent schooling components
are not systematically diﬀerent between men and women. Results based on data
that combine information of men and women tend to report lower returns that are
smaller (in absolute value). Table 3 presents the results from meta-regressions in
which the estimated returns to the three schooling components are regressed on
study characteristics. These results reiterate the patterns observed in Table 2 in a
multivariate framework.
The quotes that we cited in Section 2 demonstrate that the types of results sum-
marized in this subsection have been interpreted as causal eﬀects of overeducation
and undereducation on wages. Wording like: “a positive eﬀect”, “holding other
characteristics constant”, “not completely unproductive”, “results in”, “returns are
very low” and “productivity is aﬀected” are very explicit in that respect. Because
of problems with omitted variable bias and measurment error, we believe that such
interpretations are not warranted.
6 Relation to labor market theories
The incidence of over and underschooling and the pattern of estimated returns to
required, over and underschooling have been interpreted in terms of various labor
market theories. In this section, we give a brief summary of these interpretations,
and the (sometimes) implicit assumptions made for these interpretations.
6.1 Human capital
According to Mincer’s wage equation only the amount of attained schooling matters
for wages. Since Duncan and Hoﬀman’s wage equation nests Mincer’s equation
32Table 3. Meta-regressions
δr δo δu
Dummy Asia=1 0.033*** 0.010 -0.029**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Dummy Europe=1 -0.011 -0.006 -0.013
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
US/Canada, Mexico, Australia reference reference reference
Decade 1970s -0.015 -0.010 0.002
(0.012) (0.010) (0.014)
Decade 1980s -0.014* -0.004 0.014*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Decade 1990s 0.018** -0.015* 0.025***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Decade 2000s reference reference reference
Measure Mean 0.003 -0.004 0.014
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Measure Job Analysis -0.014* 0.007 -0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Measure Mode 0.000 0.008 -0.010
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Measure Workers’ Assessment reference reference reference
Fixed eﬀects -0.041*** -0.014 0.003
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Instrumental Variables 0.033 -0.084** -0.006
(0.018) (0.031) (0.035)
OLS reference reference reference
Dummy Male=1 0.001 0.010 -0.013
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Dummy Female=1 0.012 0.010 -0.017*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Dummy Both Genders=1 reference reference reference
Constant 0.089*** 0.043*** -0.024***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
N 151 151 143
Source: Database constructed from existing studies. Each column gives the results from a diﬀerent
meta-regression in which studies’ estimates are regressed on study characteristics. Each estimate
is weighted by the inverse of its variance. See Harbord and Higgins (2004) for details. for details.
33as a special case, it is straightforward to test whether the restrictions implied by
Mincer’s equation can be rejected. This is a test of the joint equality: δr = δo = −δu.
Without exception, this restriction is rejected by the data. This has been interpreted
as evidence against a simple version of the human capital model in which wages are
solely determined by attained level of schooling independent of the job to which a
worker has been assigned.
The results are, however, consistent with slightly adapated versions of the human
capital model. A ﬁrst possibility is that being in a job that requires less schooling
than available, provides an investment opportunity. This idea has been formalized
by Sicherman and Galor (1990). We discuss this contribution in more detail in the
next subsection.
Also consistent with the human capital model is that overschooling substitutes for
other components in a person’s stock of human capital, such as training, experience
and innate ability. The ﬁnding that overschooling is more prominent among younger
workers is consistent with this. It is also consistent with the reported negative
correlation between overschooling and measures of ability; see Section 4.
6.2 Career mobility
Sicherman and Galor (1990) formalized the notion of career mobility as an explana-
tion for the phenomenon of overeducation. They constructed a model of which the
assumptions immediately imply that a worker with given innate ability may prefer
to start in a job below his ability level if this is compensated by a higher probability
to be promoted. According to Sicherman and Galor this implies that "individuals
may consider a lower-level ﬁrm in which the direct return to schooling is lower if in
those ﬁrms, for a given level of schooling, the probability of promotion is higher". To
test this implication of their model, the authors estimate for 24 diﬀerent occupations
the eﬀect of education on wages and the eﬀect of education on the probability of up-
ward career mobility. They ﬁnd that the estimated eﬀects are negatively correlated:
occupations with a higher wage return to education have on average a smaller eﬀect
of education on upward mobility. This supports their model.
Sicherman and Galor (1990) also claim that their model implies that "it will be
rational for some individuals to spend a portion of their working careers in occupa-
tions that require a lower level of schooling than they have acquired" (p.177). This
implication is further explored in Sicherman (1991). He regresses an indicator for
upward mobility on indicators for overschooling and underschooling, controlling for
attained schooling, experience (squared) and some other observables. The results
show positive coeﬃcients for the overschooling and underschooling indicators and
34a negative coeﬃcient for attained schooling. Although Sicherman summarizes his
ﬁnding with respect to the overschooling coeﬃcient as indicating that "overeducated
workers are more likely to move to a higher-level occupation than workers with the
required level of schooling.", the results from the speciﬁcation that controls for expe-
rience (squared) suggest the opposite. Overeducated workers are more likely to move
to a higher level-occupation than workers with the same level of attained schooling
who are not over or undereducated. 21 This calls into question why the overeducated
invested in schooling; they earn more than the not adequately educated in the same
occupation, but at the same time also have a lower promotion probability.
Sicherman also ﬁnds that underschooled workers are more likely to be promoted
than someone with the same level of schooling working in an occupation requiring
this schooling level (with the eﬀect being even bigger than that of the overschooling
dummy). This puzzling ﬁnding can be explained if the underschooling is highly
correlated with unobserved ability.
6.3 Job competition
Thurow (1975) proposed a theory of job competition which stipulates that wages
are solely determined by requirements of the job. Based on their attained school-
ing, workers are ranked in order of trainability, and the highest ranked workers is
assigned to the highest ranked job. Attained schooling does, however, not aﬀect
earnings directly. This model implies the following testable restriction for Duncan
and Hoﬀman’s wage equation: δo = δu = 0. These equalities are almost always
rejected by the data.
Job competition is closely related to the notion of crowding out of lower educated
workers by higher educated workers during recessions. Gautier et al. (2002) ﬁnd no
support for this process. Only for one out of six job complexity levels they ﬁnd
that ﬁrms upgraded their workforce in low employment years. As far as crowding
out takes place, it is more outﬂow driven than inﬂow driven. While this result
seems to contradict Thurow’s model, the study ﬁnds at the same time that at a
given level of job complexity workers with relatively many years of schooling are
not more productive than their direct colleagues. The authors explain the diﬀerence
between this results and the results in the overeducation literature by the fact that
their analysis takes account of match speciﬁc eﬀects. This means that workers
with relatively many years of schooling (compared to other workers at the same
21The coeﬃcient for years of attained schooling equals -0.0676, and the coeﬃcient of the over-
schooling dummy equals 0.2181. Hence, if someone is more than 3 (≈ 0.2181/0.0676) years overe-
ducated, his probability to be promoted is smaller than that of the correctly educated workers in
the same occupation.
35job level) select themselves into high wage ﬁrms. This results is consistent with
Thurow’s model, and points to the fact that estimation of Duncan and Hoﬀman’s
wage equation is not the correct approach to test Thurow’s model.
6.4 Signaling/screening
Since the early 1970s, the human capital model has been contested by the signal-
ing hypothesis of Spence (1973). According to Spence’s original signaling model,
investments in schooling are eﬃcient from an individual’s point of view, but do not
aﬀect a worker’s productivity. Schooling does, however, still have a role in allocating
the most productive workers to jobs in which they can be more productive. To the
extent that this allocative role of schooling can be replaced by a less expensive selec-
tion mechanims, there is overinvestment in schooling. This source of overinvestment
in schooling has not been addressed in the overeducation literature.
6.5 Preferences
The consumptive value of education may explain why people acquire more schooling
than is optimal from a more narrow perspective of maximizing lifetime earnings.
Since people may diﬀer in their taste for schooling, some will overinvest more than
others. If some people extract disutility from attending school, this may explain
why some people underinvest in schooling. To our knowledge, this issue has been
largely ignored in the economics of education literature.22
People may also diﬀer in the degree to which they value leisure on the job. Jobs
with lower skill requirements are likely to come with more leisure on the job for
someone with a given skill level. The opposite would then hold for people working
in a job above their acquired skill level. The signiﬁcantly negative/positive impact
of over/underschooling on job satisfaction reported by Hersch (1991); Korpi and
Tahlin (2009); Verhaest and Omey (2006b) contradict this explanation.
Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) develop a simple model with two sectors (the
college and the noncollege sector) and two types of workers (college and noncollege
graduates). Both sectors produce according to a production function in which the
two types of workers are perfect substitutes. The productivity of college graduates
is more similar to that of noncollege graduates in the noncollege sector than in the
college sector. Workers are allowed to have heterogeneous preferences with regard to
22Exceptions are Lazear (1977) and Oosterbeek and Van Ophem (2000). Using a Cobb-Douglas
utility function U = lnN+αlns, the latter study ﬁnds that α is on average 1.1 and ranges between
0.24 and 1.68, implying that even those with the lowest taste for education extract positive utility
from it.
36being empoyed in the two sectors. Some college graduates require a higher premium
to work in the college sector than others. Gottschalk and Hansen show that in this
framework, in equilibrium, some college workers voluntarily choose to work in the
noncollege sector. Their overschooling (Gottschalk and Hansen avoid to use this
term) does in this model, not signal a misallocation of resources or an involuntary
assignment across sectors.
6.6 Search and frictions
The labor market does not operate frictionless, and over/underschooling can be
the manifestations of frictions. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) proposed a matching
model in which on-the-job search is not possible. They show that in that case, two
types of equilibria can emerge: highly-educated workers match with skilled and with
unskilled jobs, or highly-educated workers refuse to take unskilled jobs. Which of
these equilibria emerges depends on the gap in productivity between skilled and
unskilled jobs and on the share of high skilled workers in the workforce.
Gautier (2002) allows high-skilled workers to search on the job. In that case, the
degree to which high skilled workers accept simple jobs depends on their relative
productivity in such jobs, and on their quit rate. Dolado et al. (2009) analyze a
model with on-the-job search very similar to that of Gautier, but allow wages to
depend on aggregate labor market outcomes. Highly-educated workers may end up
in unskilled jobs for which they are overqualiﬁed but are allowed to engage in on-the-
job search on pursuit of a better job. Skill mismatch has in that case a transitory
nature. This job-acceptance rule is very similar in spirit to the one proposed by
Sicherman and Galor (1990). Here too, we may argue that the empirical regularity
that overschooling is for many persistent, is at odds with these models.
7 Conclusion
This chapter surveyed the economics literature on overschooling. The initial mo-
tivation to study this topic were concerns about a strong increase in the number
of college graduates in the early 1970s in the US and a concurrent decrease in the
returns to college education. These concerns were fueled by Freeman’s book “The
Overeducated American”. We reconstruct that fresh evidence that was published
shortly after Freeman’s book should have been suﬃcient to temper the concerns.
Yet, not too long after, Duncan and Hoﬀman published their seminal paper that
started the subﬁeld of the economics of overeducation.
The main vehicle in this literature is an extended version of Mincer’s wage equa-
37tion where actual years of schooling is broken down in years of overschooling, years
of required schooling and years of underschooling. The additional estimates that
this speciﬁcation produces are not very useful from the perspective of the decision
to invest in schooling – neither from an individual nor from an aggregate perspec-
tive. From both perspectives it is only the expected (private of social) return on
completed schooling that counts. At best are the separate estimates informative
about the riskiness of investments in schooling.
The eﬃciency implications of mismatch are interesting and to our knowledge
nobody has pursued them to date. Potentially, estimates of returns to required
schooling, overschooling and underschooling are informative about the costs of mis-
match. Such estimates, together with information about the assignment of workers
(by completed schooling) to jobs (by required schooling), could allow us to calculate
by how much productivity (approximated by the wage sum) could increase by real-
locating workers to jobs that require their schooling. Unfortunately, the estimates
that have been produced are not suitable for such an exercise because the litera-
ture has not been able to separate the impact of mismatch from unobserved ability.
Measurement error, which is already an issue for the estimation of the return to
completed schooling, is probably much more problematic in the context of required
schooling and over/underschooling and poses an additional hurdle to the consistent
estimation of the eﬀects of interest.
The micro overschooling literature was born out of an additional variable – re-
quired schooling – in the PSID. From that Duncan and Hoﬀman could construct
measures of overschooling and underschooling at an individual level, which they
could then loosely connect to concerns about overschooling at an aggregate level.
From this start onwards, the overschooling literature has lacked substantive hypothe-
ses. Instead results from Duncan and Hoﬀman’s wage equation have been loosely
interpreted in terms of existing theories. But we are reluctant to attach too much
weight to these interpretations given that it is unclear to what extent the estimates
are reliable.
Our overall conclusion regarding the contributions of the overschooling literature
to our understanding of the functioning of labor markets and investment in education
is rather pessimistic. The literature has produced dozens of estimates of the returns
to required schooling, overschooling an underschooling. But although some studies
express awareness that omitted variable (ability) bias and measurement error may be
a concern, these issues have not been addressed is a satisfying way. As a result, the
estimates that have been reported cannot be interpreted as causal. Consequently,
the estimates are consistent with the plethora of interpretations reviewed in Section
386. Our own reading of the evidence is that omitted variable bias is substantial and
possibly explains the entire diﬀerence between returns to required schooling and
overschooling and underschooling.
Ideally, a review like this one solves existing problems or at least provides a
roadmap as how to proceed. Unfortunately, this chapter does not live up to that
ideal. The overeducation/mismatch literature has for too long led a separate life
of modern labor economics and the economics of education. We conclude that the
conceptional measurement of overeducation has not been resolved, omitted variable
bias and measurement error are too serious to be ignored, and that substantive
economic questions have not been rigorously addressed. Hence new contributions
seem only worthwhile if they include a serious attempt to tackle (at least one of)
these issues.
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c
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
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o
d
e
s
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T
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u
s
t
r
i
a
;
A
U
=
A
u
s
t
r
a
l
i
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;
B
E
=
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e
l
g
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u
m
;
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a
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=
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i
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n
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;
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u
b
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c
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=
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d
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r
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u
b
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r
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c
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r
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